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Abstract
The transmission channels through which monetary policy affects business
investment remain opaque.  This paper examines the importance of the interest
rate and credit channels on business fixed investment in Germany.  We have at
our disposal three uniquely rich datasets -- a panel of financial statement data for
6,408 firms (44,345 datapoints) supplemented with user costs of capital and
confidential measures of creditworthiness. We uncover a statistically significant
interest rate channel.  Its economic significance can be sizeable, but depends on
auxiliary assumptions.  Sorting firms with our direct measure of creditworthiness,
we find that credit constraints are important for a subset of firms.  Sortings by
firm size or dividend payout ratios shed some light on continuing debates in the
literature.
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And I’m not saying that there is a black box, or anything of 
that nature, but the complexity of our economy is such, 
and the way liquidity flows through the system is such that 
you essentially get very complex differences in the way 
monetary policy plays out, but at the end of the day, it does 
seem to be effective. 
      Alan  Greenspan  (2001) 
 
I.  Introduction 
Since the publication of the landmark Monetary History by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963), there has been increasing acceptance that monetary policy matters 
for short-run fluctuations.
1  Nonetheless, the precise channels through which 
monetary policy affects economic activity remain opaque.  This paper sheds some 
light on the black box of monetary transmission by exploiting three particularly rich 
datasets containing detailed panel data on creditworthiness, user costs, and financial 
statements for a large number of German firms.  
A recent symposium (Mishkin, 1995) highlights both the consensus that 
money matters and the continuing disagreements over the transmission channels 
through which money affects aggregate demand.  The traditional interest rate 
channel links monetary policy to real activity directly by changes in interest rates.  
Spending elasticities are a key element for the empirical relevance of this channel.  
While debatable, there is substantial evidence that these elasticities are too low to 
account for the observed potency of monetary policy, and hence questions arise 
concerning the quantitative importance of the interest rate channel of monetary 
policy.
2    
  These low price elasticities have partly motivated research on a second 
transmission mechanism to explain money’s powerful impact on economic activity.
3  
The credit channel holds that variations in the price and availability of credit are also 
elements in monetary transmission.  Monitoring costs affect the price and 
                                           
1  Among many studies, see Romer and Romer (1989), Bernanke and Blinder (1992), and 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) for evidence for the United States, and the surveys by 
Blanchard (1990) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999).  
 
2 For business fixed investment in the United States, see the surveys by Chirinko (1993a, 1993b), 
who concludes that the response of investment to its user cost is low.  Contrasting (high elasticity) 
interpretations can be found in Taylor (1995) and Hassett and Hubbard (1997).  
 
3 Low price elasticities have also prompted some researchers to examine the impact of irreversible 
capital and uncertainty in order to understand investment behavior (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; 
Caballero, 1999).   






availability of credit.  Asymmetric information results in moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems that create a wedge between the costs of internal and external 
finance.  Contractionary monetary policy increases the wedge.  Consequently, the 
effective cost of external finance is raised for those firms whose credit rating is 
suspect, and investment spending is reduced.   
To obtain a better understanding of  monetary policy in industrialized 
countries, this paper examines the strength of the interest rate and credit channels on 
business fixed investment, which is a large and highly volatile component of 
aggregate demand.  We begin in Section II by describing the three unique datasets 
for German firms at our disposal.  First, as part of its rediscount lending operation 
(described more fully in Section II.C), the Bundesbank routinely determined overall 
creditworthiness through a detailed discriminant analysis.
4  These confidential credit 
ratings are a precise indicator of those firms facing a substantial external finance 
wedge.  Our direct creditworthiness measure allows for more accurate inferences 
than is possible with the indirect measures used previously in the literature.  Second, 
we compute user costs of capital (which include the interest rate) along the lines 
presented in King and Fullerton (1984), adapting important prior work by Harhoff 
and Ramb (2001) and Ramb (2003) for the purposes of this study.  The user cost 
variable is key to evaluating the interest rate channel of monetary policy.  Third, in 
discharging its credit evaluation obligation, the Bundesbank also collects a vast 
amount of detailed financial statement data.  After accounting for lags, outliers, and 
missing observations, we have 44,345 datapoints for 6,408 firms for the period 
1988-1997.  In combination, these three datasets provide a unique opportunity to 
analyze the interest rate and credit channels of monetary policy.   
   Model specification issues are considered in Section III.  We begin with a 
discussion of the econometric equation.  Investment models can be set into one of 
two broad classes depending on how explicitly the econometric model follows from 
a formal optimization problem.  The explicit and implicit modeling strategies are 
evaluated.  Given the questions we wish to address and the empirical performance of 
many explicit models, we adopt an implicit modeling strategy.  Our estimating 
equation is based on the neoclassical theory of capital accumulation (beginning with 
Jorgenson, 1963), and is an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model relating 
the investment/capital ratio to current and lagged values of a price variable (the 
growth rate in user cost), a quantity variable (the growth rate in sales), and a 
financing variable (cash flow scaled by the capital stock), as well as lags of the 
dependent variable.     
                                           
4 Since the implementation of the Monetary Union on January 1, 1999, the Bundesbank continues 
to assess creditworthiness in the course of the Eurosystem monetary policy operations, but it no 
longer rediscounts trade bills.   






  Section IV contains our baseline empirical results.  We evaluate three 
different GMM estimation strategies for our dynamic panel model and various lag 
lengths.  The specification tests favor a model with three lags and fixed effects 
removed by first differencing.    
Sections V and VI evaluate the interest rate and credit channels, respectively, 
for business fixed investment.  A statistically significant interest rate channel is 
identified in Section V.  Economic significance is evaluated by investment’s 
responsiveness to variations in interest rates.  A 100 basis point decrease in the real 
long-term rate for two years would increase investment by 7.55%.  The power of the 
interest rate channel, however, depends on the relation between short-term monetary 
policy instruments and long-term real capital market rates.    
In Section VI, the credit channel is evaluated with two differential sensitivity 
tests, one with respect to cash flow (used frequently in previous studies) and a new 
test that focuses on user cost coefficients.  We use our unique measure of 
creditworthiness to sort firms by their susceptibility to finance constraints.  
Financially constrained firms exhibit increased sensitivity to cash flow and 
decreased sensitivity to price incentives (embedded in the user cost) relative to 
unconstrained firms.  Both results suggest the importance of credit constraints for a 
subset of firms.  Other sortings are performed for firm size and the dividend payout 
ratio.  When the creditworthiness measure is included as an additional regressor, it 
proves significant.    
    Section VII draws conclusions for monetary transmission in Germany, and 
suggests the direction of future work.  
 
 
II.  Datasets 
A.  Creditworthiness Ratio (CWR) 
  A unique element in this study is the set of creditworthiness ratios 
(Gesamtkennzahl, CWR’s) generated by the Bundesbank in performing its 
rediscounting and lending operations.  Bills of exchange are issued by nonfinancial 
firms, and were frequently presented to the Bundesbank by credit institutions (cf. fn. 
4).  When a bill was presented for discounting, the creditworthiness of the issuing 
firm and all other firms that have held this bill needed to be determined.  In the case 
of default, liability for payment of the bill fell on any firm that had held the bill.  By 
law, the Bundesbank could only accept bills backed by three parties known to be 
creditworthy.   
The Bundesbank evaluates firms by undertaking a massive effort at collecting 
financial statement data (discussed in Section II.C) and computing CWR’s using 
discriminant analysis.
5  The two underlying populations are solvent and insolvent 
                                           
5 See Deutsche Bundesbank (1999) for further details about the construction of the CWR’s and the 






firms, where insolvency is indicated by a legal application for bankruptcy.  The 
sample is constructed by first identifying the relatively scarce insolvent firms, and 
then adding a solvent firm from the same sector.  To enhance the statistical 
properties of the discriminant function, the sample contains an equal number of 
solvent and insolvent firms.  The following information is used to compute the 
discriminant function:  1) equity/pension provision ratio (adjusted equity capital and 
pension provisions as a percentage of total capital employed); 2) return on total 
capital employed (profit before income taxes and before interest payments as a 
percentage of total capital employed); 3) return on equity (profit before income taxes 
as a percentage of adjusted equity income); 4) capital recovery rate (net receipts as a 
percentage of capital invested); 5) net interest payment ratio (net interest as a 
percentage of turnover); 6) accounting practice (which affects available valuation 
methods).  The weights assigned to these categories are confidential.  These ratios 
are examined by the Bundesbank’s Department of Credit, Foreign Exchange, and 
Financial Markets for outliers.  The original CWR’s range between -99.9 and 99.9, 
and have been transformed for this study to vary between 0 and 1.   
The discriminant analysis determines two critical values of the CWR that 
classifies firms into one of three categories:  high degree of creditworthiness (Good), 
low degree of creditworthiness (Endangered), or indeterminate.  The proportion of 
distressed firms in the data used in the discriminant analysis appears representative, 
and compares favorably to the percentage of failed firms in the overall economy 
(Deutsche Bundesbank, 1998; Stoess, 2001).   
B.  User Cost (UC)   
The user cost of capital (UC) is the variable through which the interest rate 
channel of monetary policy operates.  In very simple terms, the user cost is 
comprised of three components, 
  U C   =   R  *  P  *  T ,                  ( 1 )  
where R, P, and T represent rental, price, and tax terms, respectively.  The rental 
term contains two components, the opportunity cost of funds measured by the real 
long-term interest rate (r = i - the nominal discount rate (iless the expected rate of 
inflation () in the price of investment goods) and the economic rate of depreciation 
().  The P term is the price of investment goods relative to the price of output.  Two 
key taxes entering T are the rate of income taxation (reflecting both federal and 
Laender rates, as well as the “solidarity surcharge”) and the present value of the 
stream of current and future tax depreciation deductions.    
  Equation (1) summarizes the price incentives faced by a profit-maximizing firm 
(conditioned on the level of output) when evaluating the acquisition of the marginal 
unit of capital.  However, the user cost variable used in this study is much more 






C. Financial Statements (UBS)  
The Bundesbank’s financial statement database (Unternehmens-
bilanzstatistik, UBS) constitutes the largest source of accounting data for 
nonfinancial firms in Germany.
6  About 70,000 annual accounts were collected per 
year on a strictly confidential basis by the Bundesbank’s branch offices.  These data 
were initially subjected to a computer check for logical errors and missing data.  
Approximately 15,000 accounts had to be excluded because they were incomplete, 
represented consolidated accounts, or were for firms in sectors (e.g., agriculture) for 
which no meaningful results could be generated owing to the small amount of 
available data.  Additional checks and corrections for errors were undertaken in the 
Statistical Department at the Bundesbank’s Central Office in Frankfurt before 
finalizing the UBS database.   
The dataset used in estimation is smaller for several reasons.  We use data 
only for firms located in the manufacturing sector of West Germany to avoid any 
issues of comparability between the western and eastern sections of the country.  
Sole proprietorships and private partnerships are excluded because their tax 
treatment depends on personal characteristics that are very difficult to quantify and, 
since they do not have a meaningful dividend decision, the split sample analysis in 
Section VI.C would not be feasible.  State dominated corporations are also excluded.  
The dataset is further reduced by first-differencing, missing values, data cleaning, 
variable construction involving lags, and outlier control.
7  The data extend from 
1988 to 1997.
8  We thus have available for our preferred econometric specification 
containing three lags (discussed in Section IV) 44,345 datapoints for 6,408 firms.  
For 1996, these data represent 42% of the total turnover of the West German 
manufacturing sector and 61% of the total turnover of incorporated firms in all 
German manufacturing.  
D.  Summary Statistics 
    Table 1 contains summary statistics for the variables that will enter the 
econometric specification; variable definitions are displayed in the table note.  Sub-
samples to be used in subsequent estimation are defined by CWR, firm size as 
measured by the average number of employees, and the dividend payout ratio.  The 
                                           
6 This discussion draws on the Deutsche Bundesbank (1998) and Stoess(2001), which contain 
more detailed descriptions of the UBS data.  The UBS has been utilized by Harhoff and Ramb 
(2001) in a user cost study and von Kalckreuth (2000) in an uncertainty study.   
 
7 We control for outliers by discarding the upper and lower 1% tails of sales growth, cash flow divided by 
the capital stock, and the CWR, and the upper 2% tail of the investment capital ratio.    
 
8 The beginning year of 1988 is chosen because the definitions of many important financial 
statement variables were changed in 1986 by the directive harmonizing financial statements in the 
European Union.  For many firms, the changes were not instituted in 1987, and the amount of data 






means of the variables across the sub-samples defined by the three sorting variables 
are presented in Table 2.  A noteworthy feature of the UBS dataset is  
 
 
Table 1:  Summary Statistics for the Full Sample 
 
 
                                 (1)            (2)            (3)            (4)             (5)            (6)            (7) 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev. Min.  25%  Median  75%  Max. 
It / Kt-1  0.1813  0.220  0  0.0585 0.1161 0.2157 2.2138 
logUCt  0.0222 0.0717 -0.3478  -0.0178 0.0094 0.0644 0.4991 
UCt  0.1587 0.0183 0.0857 0.1457 0.1572 0.1697 0.2812 
logSt  0.0206 0.1597 -0.5959  -0.0654 0.0214 0.1068 0.8308 
St  173.15 1455.12  0.27  9.94  26.13  71.25 65,900.0
CFt / Kt-1  0.2843 0.4941 -1.9143 0.1091 0.1887 0.3308 9.2678 
CWRt  0.0004 0.0427 -0.3515  -0.0210 0.0050 0.0220 0.4905 
CWRt  0.5736 0.0618 0.3655 0.5355 0.5735 0.6150 0.7390 
 
Notes To Table 1: 
The sample contains 44,345 datapoints for 6408 firms for 1988-1997, and is the sample used for the 
benchmark ADL(3) model.   It/Kt-1 is the investment/capital ratio; UCt is the user cost of capital; St 
is real sales in millions of Deutschmarks; CFt/Kt-1 is the cash flow/capital ratio; CWRt is the 
creditworthiness ratio;  is the first-difference operator.  See Section II and Appendix A for more 






Table 2:  Means For Sub-Samples 
 
                                CREDIT RATING                   FIRM SIZE            PAYOUT RATIO      






Good Small Large Low  High 
It / Kt-1  0.1776 0.1891 0.1806 0.1981 0.1669 0.1893 0.1837 
logUCt  0.0217 0.0228 0.0222 0.0229 0.0216 0.0224 0.0223 
UCt  0.1584 0.1579 0.1589 0.1559 0.1611 0.1565 0.1588 
logSt  0.0111 0.0265 0.0218 0.0232 0.0184 0.0208 0.0228 
St  51.16  57.98 225.31 13.95 309.42 63.36 163.83 
CFt / Kt-1   0.1563 0.2262 0.3267 0.3253 0.2492 0.1937 0.3208 
CWRt  -0.0005 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0002 0.0009 0.0008 0.0003 
 CWRt  0.5147 0.5399 0.5946 0.5643 0.5818 0.5540 0.5770 
Datapoints  7,489  6,029 30,824  20,452  23,893 4,028 32,243 
Firms 
1,131 893 4,384  3,053  3,355 591 4,639 
 
Notes To Table 2: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions.  The sub-samples presented in columns 1-3 are 
defined by CWRt: Endangered [Good] are those datapoints below [above] the lower [higher] 
critical value of CWR; Indeterminate are those datapoints between the two critical values.  The sub-
samples presented in columns 4-5 are sorted by the number of employees: Small are those 
datapoints for firms with less than 100 employees; Large is the complementary class.  The sub-
samples presented in columns 6-7 are sorted by the dividend payout ratio:  Low are those datapoints 
for firms that did not pay a dividend; High is the complementary class.   The number of datapoints 
in the sub-samples is less than that for the full sample because some datapoints could not be 
classified.  
 






the extensive coverage of small firms.  Table 3 presents the size distribution of the 
datapoints by mean employment, and documents the remarkable representation of 
small firms in the UBS dataset.  Nearly one-half of the observations in the full 
sample are for firms with 100 employees or fewer.    
 
 
Table 3:  Size Distribution Of Firms And Datapoints 
               Measured By Mean Employment 
 
                              (1)                (2)                (3)                (4)               (5)                 (6) 
  n < 20  20<n≤100 100<n≤250 250<n<500 n>500 Sum 
Firms  616 2,437  1,626 828  901 6,408 
  9.61 %  38.03 %  25.37 %  12.92 %  14.06 %  100% 
Datapoints  3,989 16,463  11,372 5,936  6,589 44,345 
  9.00%  37.12% 25.64% 13.39% 14.85%  100% 
 
Notes To Table 3:  
For the full sample, the mean and median number of employees (n) is 405 and 119, respectively.  
The sample contains 44,345 datapoints for 6,408 firms for 1988-1997, and is the sample used for 
the benchmark ADL(3) model.  In 1996, these firms have 2,593,100 employees, representing about 
45% of total employment in the West German manufacturing sector.   
 
 
III.  Model Specification 
   The numerous models appearing in the investment literature can be divided 
into two broad categories depending on whether dynamic elements are treated 
explicitly or implicitly.
9  Models are included in the former category if dynamic 
elements appear explicitly in the optimization problem and if the estimated 
coefficients are linked explicitly to the underlying technology and expectation 
parameters.  The implicit category contains those investment models that do not 
meet these criteria.   These different approaches are reviewed below in light of our 
goal of assessing quantitatively the monetary transmission mechanism.  
  The most popular explicit models can be derived from a common optimization 
problem.  If frictions are modeled as convex adjustment costs, then the first-order 
conditions for intertemporal profit maximization imply a decision rule for 
investment spending in which the investment/capital ratio is a function of the 
shadow price of capital, defined as the discounted sum of current and future returns 
                                           
9 This section draws on Chirinko (1993a, 1993b), which contains an extensive list of references. 






from the marginal unit of capital.  The key problem facing the applied 
econometrician is that this shadow price is not observed.  Investment models based 
on convex adjustment cost frictions -- the Brainard-Tobin’s Q, Euler Equation, and 
Direct Forecasting -- differ only in how the applied econometrician solves this 
unobservability problem.
10   
Explicit models have the notable advantages of being based on a choice-
theoretic framework and having coefficients in the econometric equation that can be 
identified with technology and expectation parameters.  However, their empirical 
performance has been disappointing, their parameter estimates appear fragile in 
many applications, and they do not provide a framework for assessing both the 
interest rate and credit channels for investment spending.  Consequently, given the 
current state of development of explicit models, our analysis can best be carried out 
with an implicit model.  
   There is a wide variety of implicit models.  The specification used in this 
paper defines a desired capital stock in terms of user cost and sales variables having 
separate elasticities.  This demand for the stock of capital is translated into a demand 
for the flow of investment by relating the percentage change in capital (or the 
investment/capital ratio less depreciation, I/K - ) to the current and lagged 
percentage changes in the user cost (UC) and sales (S).  To allow for a general 
pattern of dynamic responses, lagged dependent variables are included.  We also 
enter current and lagged values of a financing variable, the ratio of cash flow to the 
capital stock (CF/K), to capture the effects of financing constraints.  These 
considerations lead to the estimating equation as the following autoregressive 
distributed lag (ADL(H)) model of lag length H: 
 
                              H                                    H 
  Ii,t/Ki,t-1  =  i   -      h 	logUCi,t-h     +       
h 	logSi,t-h           (2) 
                             h=0                                h=0 
 
                           H                                        H 
                       +    h (CFi,t-h / Ki,t-1-h)    +       h (Ii,t-h / Ki,t-1-h)   +   t  +  ei,t , 
                          h=0                                     h=1 
  
where the ’s, 
’s, ’s, and the ’s are estimated coefficients, t is a series of time 
dummies that capture aggregate shocks, ei,t is a stochastic error term, i indexes firms, 
                                           
10 Some other frictions lead to only modest changes in the decision rule.  The model of 
irreversibility and uncertainty of Abel and Eberly (1994) generates a specification where the 
Brainard-Tobin’s Q appears as a polynomial.  Time-to-build and delivery lags alter timing relations 
in the benchmark explicit model (Barnett and Sakellaris, 1998).  






and t indexes time.
11  The i coefficient reflects the firm’s mix of capital assets, is 
proportional to the depreciation rate (i), and is firm specific.  More generally, this 
firm-specific constant term captures all firm-specific effects.  The other coefficients 
do not vary across firms.  A derivation of (2) is provided in Appendix B.  
Equation (2) has three important advantages for assessing the monetary 
transmission mechanism.  First, a similar specification has been used frequently, and 
has performed well empirically.
12  Second, a user cost variable appears in the 
specification, and provides a direct means for considering the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy.  The user cost varies both through time and across firms, and thus 
panel data can be very useful in estimating user cost coefficients.  Third, equation 
(2) allows us to assess the importance of the credit channel by examining the 
coefficients on cash flow.  The major concern with implicit models is the Lucas 
Critique.  While undoubtedly correct theoretically, the Lucas Critique does not 
appear to be quantitatively important.
13   
                                           
11 Note that the H’s for the individual distributed lags and lagged dependent variable will differ in 
the trimmed results to be presented in Tables 5-9.   
12 This model was developed over several years in spirited exchanges.  Among other studies, see 
Jorgenson (1963), Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967, 1969), Hall and Jorgenson (1967, 1969), Coen 
(1969), and Eisner and Nadiri (1968, 1970).  Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999), Harhoff and 
Ramb (2001), and Bond, Elston, Mairesse, and Mulkay (2001) use variants of this model recently 
with panel data. 
 
13 See Chirinko (1988), Taylor (1989), and Chirinko, Fazzari, and Meyer (1999) regarding 






 IV.  Model Selection 
  We begin by examining the validity of our Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ADL(H)) model.  Equation (2) is estimated with various lag lengths (H) and 
alternative estimation techniques.  We estimate ADL(2), ADL(3), and ADL(4) 
models by GMM.
14  However, within the class of GMM estimators, there are at least 
three different techniques for generating consistent estimates in models with fixed 
effects and endogenous regressors.  The most commonly used technique first-
differences the model variables, and uses instrumental variables in levels (Arellano 
and Bond, 1991).  The instruments are the undifferenced values of all regressors 
lagged at least two-periods (or more when feasible)  -- that is,  
Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), 	logSi,t-m(t), 	logUCi,t-m(t), CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for m t > 2, where m t is as 
large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a constant 
and year dummies are also in the instrument set.  A second approach that preserves 
the orthogonality between regressors and errors in the face of fixed effects reverses 
the above procedure, first-differencing the instruments but not transforming the 
regressors.  Since the fixed effects no longer appear in the instrument list, they will 
not affect the estimated parameters.  In this case, the instruments are the same as 
listed above except that they are first-differenced and m t > 1.  We refer to these two 
approaches as the First-Difference and Levels estimators, respectively.  A third 
approach exploits additional orthogonality by combining the two approaches.  This 
System estimator has been proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998).  
On a priori grounds, all three estimators are valid, and we employ two 
specification tests to select among the estimators and lag lengths.  Sargan (1958) and 
Hansen (1982) propose a statistic (SH) for testing overidentifying restrictions.  A 
second specification test examines residual serial correlation.  With the First-
Difference estimator, white noise errors imply that the residuals between periods t 
and t-2 will be uncorrelated.  For the Levels estimator, the requirement pertains to 
the residuals between periods t and t-1.  We use the Lagrangian Multiplier statistic 
(LM(q), q=1,2) proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) for testing q
th-order residual 
serial correlation.  If the model is correctly specified, the overidentifying restrictions 
will be sustained, and the residuals between periods t and t-q will be uncorrelated. 
  Table 4 contains the p-values for the SH and LM(q) statistics for the First-
Difference, Levels, and Systems estimators for the ADL(2), ADL(3), and ADL(4) 
models.  Only the First-Difference/ADL(3) model has a SH statistic that exceeds the 
conventional 5% level of significance.  The LM statistic for this model of 0.165 
suggests that residual serial correlation will not adversely affect  
                                           
14 All estimates are computed with DPD (Ox version 2.20 for Windows), and are the “two-step 
estimates” based on a weighting-matrix that is a function of the initial GMM parameter estimates.    






Table 4:  GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                Alternative ADL Lag Lengths And Estimators 
 
 
                                         First-Difference                  Levels          System 
                                                   (1)                                 (2)                                (3) 
ADL(2)     
SH p-value   0.002  0.000  0.000 









Observations 27,195  38,442  35,677 
Firms 8,482  11,247  8,482 
 
ADL(3)     
SH p-value  0.075  0.014  0.009 









Observations 18,713  27,195  25,121 
Firms 6,408  8,482  6,408 
 
ADL(4)     
SH p-value   0.009  0.020  0.000 









Observations 12,305  18,713  17,040 
Firms 4,735  6,408  4,735 
 
Notes To Table 4: 
The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t), logUCi,t-m(t), and CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for m t > 2, 
where m t is as large as possible given data availability and increases over the sample; a constant 
and t are also in the instrument set.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  In column 1, the model is 
first-differenced and the instruments are untransformed.  In column 2, the model is untransformed, 
and the instruments are first-differenced.  Column 3 combines the First-Differenced and Levels 
estimators. SH is the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions.  
LM is the p-value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for q
th-order autocorrelation: column 
(1), q=2; column (2), q=1; column (3), q=1/q=2.  uc is the long-run elasticity for the user cost (see 
equation (3) in the text); standard errors computed by the delta method.  An observation is defined 
by a “string“ of datapoints needed to form a contiguous relation between the dependent and current 
and lagged independent and lagged dependent variables.  Standard errors computed by the delta 






the estimated parameters.  Thus, the First-Difference/ADL(3) model is used for all 
subsequent estimates.   
  The long-run user cost elasticity (uc) is a convenient summary statistic of 
price sensitivity, and allows us to gauge the response of capital formation to the 
interest rate embedded in the user cost.  This elasticity is defined as the sum of the 
coefficients on the user cost variables divided by one minus the sum of the 
coefficients on the lagged dependent variables.
15  (The standard error of uc is 
computed by the delta method.)  In terms of the coefficients in equation (2), uc is 
defined as follows, 
   
                H                  H 
uc  =       h  /  (1 -    h  )   .          ( 3 )      
              h=0               h=0 
 
 
These statistics are also reported in Table 4.  For a given estimator, the impacts of 
the user cost are robust to variations in the lag length.  In column 1 for our preferred 
First-Difference model, the uc’s range narrowly from -0.320 to -0.445.  For the 
First-Difference estimator, the impact of the interest rate on investment would not 
appear to be sensitive to lag length.  However, estimates based on Levels or Systems 
estimators, which are statistically inappropriate in our sample, would lead to a 
substantial understatement.   
 
V.  The Interest Rate Channel 
In this section, we assess the statistical and economic significance of the 
interest rate channel of monetary policy implied by our estimates.  In the ADL 
investment model, the interest rate channel operates through the user cost.  We begin 
by presenting the complete set of estimated coefficient and other statistics for our 
preferred ADL(3) model.  As shown in column 1 of Table 5, the sums of the 
coefficients (h Xi,t-h  for variable X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}) and the long-run 
elasticities (x) for all regressors are statistically significant at the 1% level.
16      
  The results in column 2 document the important interaction between cash flow 
and user cost variables.  The cash flow variable is included in equation (2) to  
capture short-term financing effects.  When the cash flow coefficients are
                                           
15 If the production technology is CES and the identification assumptions in Appendix B are 
satisfied, uc is the price elasticity of the capital stock or, equivalently, the elasticity of substitution 
between labor and capital.  
16 The sum of coefficients accounts only for the direct effects of that variable on investment.  The 
’s captures this effect in its numerator (cf. equation 3), as well as the dynamic impact of the 
coefficients from the lags of the dependent variable in its denominator.  For sales and cash flow, the 
’s are defined by an expression very similar to (3) but with the ’s replaced by the ’s and ’s 
estimated in equation (2), respectively.  Note that cf is a semi-elasticity.   






Table 5:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                 Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1  
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
 
 
Variable                All Coefficients       No Cash Flow          Trimmed  










































































































































Table 5:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                ADL(3) And Alternative Estimators 
  
Variable                All Coefficients       No Cash Flow          Trimmed  

































SH p-value  0.075 0.048 0.092 
LM p-value  0.165 0.240 0.118 
Observations  18,713 18,713 18,713 
Firms  6,408 6,408 6,408 
 
 
Notes To Table 5: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions.  Constants (i) and year dummies (t) are also 
included in the regression equation.  The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t),  
logUCi,t-m(t), and CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data 
availability and increases over the sample; a constant and t are also in the instrument set.  
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column 1 is based on the ADL(3) 
with all lag coefficients.  Column 2 excludes the CF/K regressors.  Column 3 excludes those 
regressors in column 1 with t-statistics whose p-values are greater than 0.10.  	h Xi,t-h is the sum of 
coefficients for variable X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}.  X is the long-run elasticity for variable X (see 
equation (3) in the text); standard errors are computed by the delta method.  SH is the p-value for 
the Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions.  LM is the p-value for the Lagrange 
Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation.  An observation is defined by a “string“ 
of datapoints needed to form a contiguous relation between the dependent and current and lagged 
independent and lagged dependent variables.  Standard errors computed by the delta method.  
Section IV contains a further discussion of these statistics.    
 
 
constrained to zero, the absolute value of uc rises by 30%.  This change can be  
interpreted as an “income effect” induced by financing constraints (Chirinko, 
Fazzari, and Meyer, 1999).  For a firm operating in frictionless capital markets, a 
user cost change induces only a substitution effect.  However, interest costs and 
available internal finance are also affected by interest rates.  Fluctuations in internal 






effects arising from substitution alone.  A higher interest rate may have standard 
incentive effects on the demand for capital and investment but, for financially 
constrained firms, the resulting decline in cash flow could reduce investment further 
than if the firm operated in perfect capital markets.   
This interpretation of “income effects” is consistent with our findings in 
columns 1 and 2.  In the regression without cash flow (column 2), uc captures both 
the conventional substitution effect and the income effect induced by financing 
constraints, which affect investment in the same direction.  However, when we add 
cash flow (column 1), the lower absolute value of uc can be interpreted as the user 
cost elasticity holding cash flow constant; that is, as a measure of the conventional 
substitution effect alone.     
  Before investigating the credit channel, we note that there are several 
insignificant coefficients in the distributed lags that may affect the reported standard 
errors for the estimated coefficients, sums, and elasticities.  To obtain more precise 
estimates, we proceed to remove those variables from the model in column 1 whose 
t-statistics have a p-value that is greater than 0.10.  This trimmed specification 
includes one lag of the dependent variable, the current value of cash flow, the 
current and one lagged value of the user cost, and the current and three lagged 
values of sales.  These trimmed estimates are presented in column 3 of Table 6.  
Relative to the results in column 1, the point estimates are quite robust, and are 
estimated more precisely.  Trimmed models will be the primary focus of the 
subsequent analysis.   
  The estimates of the UC coefficients in Table 5 establish that the interest rate 
channel for business fixed investment is statistically significant.  In the remaining 
part of this section, we analyze its economic significance by evaluating the impact of 
an expansionary monetary policy that lowers the short-term nominal interest rate by 
100 basis points over two years with no offsetting increase in inflation.  In our 
framework, the effect on investment is transitory.  We assume that the central bank 
can not permanently change the real interest rate.  This assumption, coupled with the 
investment equation specification containing the growth rate in the user cost (see 
Appendix B for the derivation), implies that monetary policy can not affect the long-
run capital stock.  In the spirit of our partial equilibrium exercise, we further assume 
that all of the remaining variables are unaltered by the monetary policy.  Thus it is 
important to bear in mind that we are not presenting a total assessment of the effects 
of monetary policy.   
  To understand the key assumptions in our evaluation, consider the highly 
stylized, static investment equation drawn from equations (1) and (2), 
 
  I/K  =  -  l o g U C             ( 4 a )  
 
  UC  =  (i[m] -  + )  *  P  *  T,        (4b) 






where m is the short-term interest rate controlled by the monetary authority.  The 




  	I/K  =  -UC/i)/UC)  (di/dm)  	m ,       ( 5 a )  
 
  	I/K * (K/I)  =  -P*T) / ((i[m] -  + )*P*T)  (di/dm)  	m, (5b) 
 
	I/I  =  -I/K * (i[m] -  + ))
-1  (di/dm)  	m .      ( 5 c )  
 
The right side of equation (5c) is quantified as follows. The  is from row 1, 
column 3 of Table 5, and equals -0.209.  The  * (i[m] -  + ))
-1 term varies across 
firms and time, and the mean value computed from the sample equals 18.66.  The 
long-term rate (which enters the user cost)  is assumed to move one-for-one with the 
short-term rate controlled by the monetary authorities; hence (di/dm) = 1.  Lastly, the 
monetary policy experiment is a 100 basis point cut; hence, 	m = -0.01.   
With these assumptions, investment increases by 3.90% in the first year.  The 
above computations are applicable to the second year by replacing the  with the 
coefficient on the lagged user cost variable (-0.167) and accounting for the effect of 
the lagged dependent variable.  Over two years, investment would increase by about 
7.55% .  Since investment is approximately 18.00% of GDP, this increment 
corresponds to about a 1.40% increase in GDP.  Under this computation, the interest 
rate channel of monetary policy is economically significant.    
  However, it is important to realize that the above computations depend 
critically on the expectation assumptions reflected in the term structure of interest 
rates.  The response (di/dm) of the long-term rate (influencing investment through 
the user cost) to the short-term rate (controlled by the central bank) can have 
important impacts on the results.  There is some evidence that di/dm may be less 
than unity.
18  Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997, p. 115) examine the relation 
between short-term and long-term rates, and find that di/dm = 0.20.  With this 
assumption, the above responses of investment and GDP fall by a factor of 5.  In 
sum, while our results indicate a statistically significant monetary policy channel, its 
economic significance depends on auxiliary assumptions that are outside the scope 
                                           
17 Note that this formulation does not allow the present value of depreciation allowances (“A” in 
Appendix A) to vary with the interest rate due to computational considerations and a desire to 
separate fiscal and monetary policy issues.  
 
18 It may be difficult to represent the term structure response with a single parameter.  The relation 
will highly depend on agents’ inferences from present policy to future policy.  These inferences 
depend on the current stance of monetary policy in relation to current macroeconomic conditions, 
and hence are likely to change over time.  






of the present study.  At this point, assessments of economic significance must be 
made with due caution.  
 
 
VI.  The Credit Channel 
  Monetary policy can also affect firms through a credit channel, and our data 
on creditworthiness and user costs allow us to offers some important new evidence.  
While the literature has been characterized by sharp differences of opinion, there is 
rather broad agreement that variations in firm creditworthiness and the resulting 
wedge between internal and external finance are the key elements in models of credit 
constraints.
19  Two hypotheses are examined.  First, as in many prior studies, we 
evaluate the importance of credit constraints by the differential sensitivity to cash 
flow among firms sorted by their creditworthiness.  This sorting directly focuses on 
the fundamental element in the credit constraints literature, the external finance 
premium.  A second hypothesis is that financially constrained firms should not be 
responsive to price incentives because of rationing in credit markets (Stiglitz and 
Weiss, 1981; Williamson, 1987).  This differential sensitivity to the user cost has not 
been tested previously, perhaps owing to a lack of suitable user cost data.
20  With 
respect to the two sensitivity tests, credit constrained firms should be relatively more 
sensitive to cash flow and relatively less sensitive to the user cost.    
The standard approach in the literature is to sort firms into contrasting classes 
differentiated by some indicator variable for their external finance premium.  This 
approach has been the subject of recent criticism for using indirect and potentially 
misleading indicator.
21  However, our direct measure of creditworthiness allow us to 
avoid this problem, and generate powerful tests of credit constraints.  We also 
provide additional sortings of our sample based on firm size and dividend payout 
ratios that shed some additional light on debates in the literature. 
A.  Sorting By Creditworthiness 
  Our first split sample estimates are based on a sorting defined by a direct 
measure of the external finance premium, CWR.  Firms are sorted into three 
categories of creditworthiness -- Endangered, Good, and Indeterminate -- depending 
on the state in the year before the investment/capital ratio first enters the regression 
model as a dependent variable.  Our large sample permits us to discard the middle 
group to in order to sharpen the tests.  Estimates for the Endangered and Good 
                                           
19 For example, Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988, p. 183), Kaplan and Zingales (1997, pp. 
172-173), and Bernanke and Gertler (1990, pp. 88-89).  
 
20 Interestingly, the test was proposed at the beginning of the recent renaissance in credit constraint 
studies; see the discussion by Blinder (1988) of Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988). 
 
21 See Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000), the reply by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (2000), and 






classes of firms are presented in Table 6.  The full ADL(3) model is presented in 
columns 1 and 2.  We introduce two new statistics -- x and x, where X refers to a 
model variable -- to assess the differences between the (j Xi,t-j )’s and the x’s, 
respectively, for the Endangered and Good firms.  Trimmed estimates are presented 
in columns 3 and 4, and will be the focus of the subsequent discussion. 
The CWR split sample results offer striking confirmation of the importance of 
finance constraints.  As shown in Table 6, the sum of cash flow coefficients of 0.154 
for the firms with questionable creditworthiness is more than twice as large the 
comparable coefficient of 0.075 for Good firms.  (A similar result holds for the 
cf’s.)  The null hypothesis of equality is assessed by cf, and is rejected with a p-
value of 0.03.   More dramatic results are forthcoming for our second test on the user 
cost variable.  The sum of -0.047 for Endangered firms is not different from zero; for 
financially constrained firms, the interest rate channel appears to “shut down”.  The 
comparable estimate for Good firms is -0.459 with a standard error of 0.100.  The 
null hypothesis of the equality of these sums is again rejected.  Thus, both 
differential sensitivity tests point to the conclusion that credit constraints are 
important for German firms.   
B.  Sorting By Firm Size 
Firm size has been frequently used to identify credit constrained firms.  Small 
firms arguably face financing problems because they have less visibility in external 
capital markets and are poorly positioned to bear the fixed cost associated with 
external finance.  A firm is categorized as Small if it has 100 or fewer employees on 
average over the sample; the complementary class defines Large firms.  Since nearly 
one-half of our firms are Small, our tests should be able to detect small firm 
financing problems if they exist.   
Table 7 contains the results for the size sorting.  We again focus on the 
Trimmed results in columns 3 and 4 that have smaller standard errors and hence a 
greater chance of rejecting the null hypothesis.  Small firms have relatively larger 
cash flow coefficients.  However, the difference is not statistically significant (cf 
has a p-value of 0.17).  For the second differential sensitivity test, the results 
contradict the credit constraints hypothesis.  The user cost coefficient sum is 
relatively greater (in absolute value) for the Small and presumably constrained firms.  
The difference in user cost sums is not statistically significant.   
These results suggest one of two conclusions.  Coupled with the 
creditworthiness split sample results, some doubt is cast on whether firm size is 
useful in identifying credit constrained firms.
22  Alternatively, it may be the case  
                                           
22 Size has generated mixed results.  For example, Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1996) find that 
small firms are credit constrained.  In contrast, Oliner and Rudebusch (1992) report that size has no 
statistically significant effect in an investment equation, and Erickson and Whited (2000) find that 






Table 6:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                 Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio 
 
                                      ALL COEFFICIENTS                 TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                     Endangered               Good                Endangered               Good 















































uc  =  0.373 
            (0.290) 
uc
0.411 











  uc  =  0.419 
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uc =  0.470 























































s  =  -0.287 
            (0.116) 
s
-0.318 













s  =  -0.322 
           (0.130) 
s
-0.363 












Table 6:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By The Creditworthiness Ratio 
 
                                       ALL COEFFICIENTS               TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                     Endangered               Good                Endangered               Good 










































 CF  =  0.081 
             (0.043) 
CF
0.079 













CF  =  0.089 
            (0.049) 
CF  =  0.089 









































             (0.055) 
IK  =  -0.006 
              (0.028) 
  
 
SH p-value  0.239 0.326 
LM p-value  0.132 0.042 
Observations  16,256 16,256 






Notes To Table 6: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions.  Constants (i) and year dummies (t) are also 
included in the regression equation.  The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t),  
logUCi,t-m(t), and CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data 
availability and increases over the sample; a constant and t are also in the instrument set.  
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The estimates in columns 1 and 2 are 
sorted by CWRt: Endangered [Good] are those observations below [above] the lower [higher] 
critical value of CWR; Indeterminate observations have been excluded.  The estimates in column 3 
[4] exclude those regressors in column 1 [2] with t-statistics whose p-values are greater than 0.10.  
	h Xi,t-h is the sum of coefficients for variable X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}.  X is the long-run elasticity 
for variable X (see equation (3) in the text); standard errors are computed by the delta method.  X 
[X]  is the difference between the (	j logXi,t-j )’s [X’s] for the Endangered [Good] firms.  SH is 
the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions.  LM is the p-value 
for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation.  An observation is 
defined by a “string“ of datapoints needed to form a contiguous relation between the dependent and 
current and lagged independent and lagged dependent variables.  Section IV contains a further 




Table 7:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                 Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By Firm Size 
 
                                         ALL COEFFICIENTS                TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                         Small                     Large                    Small                     Large     
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-0.039 
(0.031) 




















uc  =  -0.328 
             (0.253) 
uc
-0.283  








(0.167)   
-0.277 
(0.104)  
  uc =  -0.316 
           (0.286) 
uc =  -0.287 






Table 7:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By Firm Size 
 
                                       ALL COEFFICIENTS               TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                           Small                     Large                   Small                     Large 





















































s  =  -0.007 













(0.077)   
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s  =  -0.059 















































 cf  =  0.058 
           (0.039) 
cf
0.050 













cf  =  0.053 
          (0.045) 
cf  =  0.048 






Table 7:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)      Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By Firm Size 
 
                                       ALL COEFFICIENTS               TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                           Small                     Large                   Small                     Large 







































             (0.046) 
IK  =  -0.086 
             (0.024) 
  
 
SH p-value  0.185 0.220 
LM p-value  0.098 0.108 
Observations  18,713   18,713 
Firms  6,408 6,408 
 
Notes To Table 7: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions.  Constants (i) and year dummies (t) are also 
included in the regression equation.  The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t),  
logUCi,t-m(t), and CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data 
availability and increases over the sample; a constant and t are also in the instrument set.  
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The estimates in column 1 and 2 are 
sorted by the number of employees: Small are those observations for firms with less than 100 
employees; Large is the complementary class.  The estimates in column 3 [4] exclude those 
regressors in column 1 [2] with t-statistics whose p-values are greater than 0.10.  	h Xi,t-h is the sum 
of coefficients for variable X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}.  X is the long-run elasticity for variable X (see 
equation (3) in the text); standard errors are computed by the delta method.  X [X]  is the 
difference between the (	j logXi,t-j )’s [X’s] for the Small [Large] firms.  SH is the p-value for the 
Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions.  LM is the p-value for the Lagrange 
Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation.   An observation is defined by a 
“string“ of datapoints needed to form a contiguous relation between the dependent and current and 
lagged independent and lagged dependent variables.  Section IV contains a further discussion of 
these statistics.   






that the German house bank system effectively overcomes the barriers to external 
finance facing small firms by resolving information problems or lowering 
transactions costs.  These results are consistent with the role of the house bank 
system described in Elsas and Krahnen (1998) and Worms (2001).   
C.  Sorting By The Dividend Payout Ratio 
  Sorting by the dividend payout ratio has been a controversial means for 
identifying credit constrained firms.  Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) 
introduced this sorting in their seminal paper.  However, it was criticized by that 
paper’s first reviewer (Blinder, 1988) and, more recently and more severely, by 
Kaplan and Zingales (1997; cf. fn. 21).  Our results in Section VI.A with CWR 
indicate clearly that a subset of firms in our sample face credit constraints.  It thus 
becomes interesting to examine whether the dividend payout ratio signals credit 
constraints, as evaluated by the two differential tests.   
  In Table 8, we sort the sample into those firms that do not pay dividends 
(Low, constituting about 11% of the sample) and the complementary class of 
dividend paying firms (High).
23  The cash flow coefficient for the non-dividend 
paying and presumably credit constrained firms equals 0.085, and is greater than the 
comparable value of 0.062 for dividend paying firms.  However, as assessed by cf, 
the difference is not statistically significant.  A different pattern of results is 
obtained for the sum of user cost coefficients -- the sum for the Low firms is very 
close to zero and smaller (in absolute value) than that for the High firms.  This result 
is consistent with the presence of credit constraints and, in contrast to the cash flow 
coefficients, the difference is statistically significant.
24  Thus, we get mixed results 
sorting by the dividend payout ratio.  Consistent with Kaplan and Zingales’ critique, 
dividend payout does not reveal a pattern of cash flow coefficients consistent with 
some firms being credit constrained.  However, our test based on the differential 
sensitivity of user costs is supportive of the credit constraints hypothesis.   
D.  Creditworthiness As An Explanatory Variable  
Our final regressions use the CWR variable to measure the external finance 
premium in a different way.  In this sub-section, CWR is a continuous indicator of 
the markup over the basic user cost as follows, 
 
  UC’  =  UC * (1 - C W R ) ,         ( 6 )  
                                           
23 The dividend payout ratio is calculated as the mean dividend payout for the first three 
observations before the year in which investment/capital ratio first enters the regression model as a 
dependent variable divided by the mean cash flow during the same time period.  Observations for 
which mean cash flow was less than or equal to zero are eliminated.   
  
24 Defining Low by non-dividend paying firms leads to the sharpest distinction between firms.  
When Low is defined by firm/year observations that are in the lower quartile or below the median, 
cf is not different from zero.   






Table 8:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                 Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                 Sub-Samples Defined By Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
                                        ALL COEFFICIENTS               TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                           Low                    High                   Low                          High 
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0.500 
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s  =  -0.085 
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s
-0.132 










(0.084)   
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s  =  -0.107 
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s=  -0.161 






Table 8:  GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)     Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
                Sub-Samples Defined By Dividend Payout Ratio 
 
                                       ALL COEFFICIENTS                  TRIMMED COEFFICIENTS. 
Variable                           Low                    High                   Low                          High 










































 cf  =  -0.031 
            (0.037) 
cf
0.023 













cf  =  -0.039 
           (0.040) 
cf  =  0.024 









































             (0.051) 
IK  =  -0.027 
             (0.027) 
  
 
SH p-value  0.071   0.112 
LM p-value  0.201 0.190 
Observations  15,351 15,351 






Notes To Table 8: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions.  Constants (i) and year dummies (t) are also 
included in the regression equation.  The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t),  
logUCi,t-m(t), and CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t) for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data 
availability and increases over the sample; a constant and t are also in the instrument set.  
Heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  The estimates in column 1 and 2 are 
sorted by the dividend payout ratio: Low are those observations for firms that did not pay a 
dividend; High is the complementary class.  The estimates in column 3 [4] exclude those regressors 
in column 1 [2] with t-statistics whose p-values are greater than 0.10.  	h Xi,t-h is the sum of 
coefficients for variable X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}.  X is the long-run elasticity for variable X (see 
equation (3) in the text); standard errors are computed by the delta method.  X [X]  is the 
difference between the (	j logXi,t-j )’s [X’s] for the Low [High] firms.  SH is the p-value for the 
Sargan-Hansen statistic testing overidentifying restrictions.  LM is the p-value for the Lagrange 
Multiplier statistic testing for second-order autocorrelation.  An observation is defined by a “string“ 
of datapoints needed to form a contiguous relation between the dependent and current and lagged 




where  > 0.  Since UC enters the model in log differences, we transform (6) 
accordingly, 

	logUC’  =  	logUC  -   * 	C W R ,        ( 7 )  
 
and enter both terms as regressors.  Owing to the timing of the inputs to the ratings 
undertaken by the Bundesbank, the first value of 	CWR in the regression equation 
should be lagged one period.   Since the user cost enters the model with a negative 
effect, we would anticipate that 	CWR would have a positive coefficient, indicating 
that investment increases with the credit rating.   
The results in Table 9 confirm the importance of credit constraints via credit 
ratings on investment.  In columns 1 (all coefficients) and 2 (trimmed coefficients), 
each 	CWR coefficient is positive, and the sum is statistically significant.  These 
results may not be fully reflective of the role of 	CWR because it and the cash flow 
terms may be both capturing the effects of credit constraints.  Cash flow variables 
are excluded from the results reported in columns 3 and 4, and the sum of 	CWR 
coefficients rises by 40% and 139%, respectively.    






Table 9:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
                 With CWRt As An Additional Explanatory Variable 
                 Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
                 ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
       
                                 WITH CASH FLOW                     WITHOUT CASH FLOW. 
Variable                          All                   Trimmed                    All                    Trimmed 















































































































TABLE 9:   GMM Parameter Estimates Of Equation (2) 
(cont.)   With  CWRt As An Additional Explanatory Variable 
                      Dependent Variable:  It / Kt-1 
   ADL(3) With The First-Difference Estimator 
  
                                 WITH CASH FLOW                     WITHOUT CASH FLOW. 
Variable                          All                     Trimmed                    All                    Trimmed 

































































































    



































SH p-value  0.063 0.056 0.040 0.036 
LM p-value  0.181 0.168 0.257 0.272 
Observations   18,713   18,713   18,713   18,713 






Notes To Table 9: 
See the note to Table 1 for variable definitions, and Section IV.D for the specification of CWRt-h 
as regressors.  Constants (i) and year dummies (t) are also included in the regression equation.  
The instruments are Ii,t-m(t)/Kt-1-m(t), logSi,t-m(t), logUCi,t-m(t),  
CFi,t-m(t)/Ki,t-1-m(t), and CWRt-m for mt > 2, where mt is as large as possible given data availability 
and increases over the sample; a constant and t are also in the instrument set.  Heteroscedastic-
consistent standard errors are in parentheses.  Column 1 is based on the ADL(3) with all lag 
coefficients, and includes lags of CWR as regressors.  Column 3 is similar to the model in column 
1, but cexcludes the CF/K regressors.  Column 2 [4] excludes those regressors in column 1 [3] with 
t-statistics whose p-values are greater than 0.10.  	h Xi,t-h is the sum of coefficients for variable 
X={UC, S, CF/K, I/K}.  X is the long-run elasticity for variable X (see equation (3) in the text); 
standard errors are computed by the delta method.  SH is the p-value for the Sargan-Hansen statistic 
testing overidentifying restrictions.  LM is the p-value for the Lagrange Multiplier statistic testing 
for second-order autocorrelation.  An observation is defined by a “string“ of datapoints needed to 
form a contiguous relation between the dependent and current and lagged independent and lagged 
dependent variables.  Section IV contains a further discussion of these statistics.    
  
 
VII.  Conclusions  
  This paper examines the monetary transmission mechanism in Germany as it 
affects business fixed investment with an extremely rich dataset containing financial 
statement, user cost, and creditworthiness data for 6,408 firms (44,345 datapoints).  
We document that both interest rate and credit channels are important in Germany.    
  While any set of empirical results must be interpreted with due caution, we 
nonetheless believe that three important policy conclusions follow from this study.  
First, we obtain a statistically and economically significant price sensitivity of 
investment spending.  Our computations suggest that a 100 basis point decrease in 
nominal interest rates (without offsetting changes in inflation expectations) over two 
years can lead to an increase of investment spending of 7.55%  and GDP of 
approximately 1.40% during the same period.  Thus, the interest rate channel of 
monetary policy can be quite potent in Germany.   
  Second, the differential responses to cash flow and user cost documented here 
suggests that changes in interest rates engineered by the central bank alter the 
external finance premium and have differential impacts across firms.  Consequently, 
the weakest firms may be the hardest hit during a monetary contraction, and 
policymakers need to look beyond broad aggregates to understand the effects of 
monetary policy.  
  Third, a continuing decline in the role of the German house bank system may 
affect the transmission mechanism.  No differential responses are uncovered when 
firms were sorted by size.  This result suggests that, over our sample, the German 
house bank system effectively overcomes barriers to external finance facing small 
firms by resolving information problems or lowering transactions costs.  If this 






mechanisms for allocating credit, the monetary transmission mechanism will likely 
be altered. 
  Whether the channels identified in this study are sufficiently strong to explain 
the aggregate effects of interest rate changes on business investment remains an 
open question.  To undertake such an evaluation, we must account for the dynamic 
feedbacks among interest rates, investment spending, and cash flows.  Given the 
differential effects across firms found in this study, these dynamic feedbacks need to 




For helpful comments, we thank Steve Bond, Nick Bloom, Jean-Bernard Chatelain, 
Andrea Generale, Ignacio Hernando, Heinz Herrmann, Amir Kia, Andy Meyer, 
Philip Vermeulen, Andy Young, and participants in seminars at the Bundesbank, the 
Institute For Fiscal Studies, Emory University and in meetings of the Monetary 
Transmission Network within the European System Of Central Banks. We also 
acknowledge the invaluable contribution of Fred Ramb with respect to the 
construction of our user cost variable. The views expressed in this paper do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Deutsche Bundesbank or CESifo.  All errors, 




Abel, Andrew B., and Eberly, Janice C., “A Unified Model Of Investment Under 
Uncertainty,” American Economic Review 84 (December 1994),  
1369-1384.  
  
  Arellano, Manuel, and Bond, Stephen, "Some Tests Of Specifications For Panel Data: 
Monte Carlo Evidence And An Application to Employment Equations," The Review of Economic 
Studies 58 (April 1991), 277-298. 
 
Arellano, Manuel and, Bover, Olympia, “Another Look At The Instrumental-Variable 
Estimation Of Error-Components Models,” Journal of Econometrics 68 (July 1995), 29-51.  
 
   Auerbach, Alan J., “Taxation, Corporate Financial Policy And The Cost Of Capital,” 
Journal of Economic Literature 21 (1983), 905-940.  
 
  Barnett, Steven A., and Sakellaris, Plutarchos, “Nonlinear Response Of Firm Investment To 
Q: Testing A Model Of Convex And Non-Convex Adjust-ment Costs,” Journal Of Monetary 
Economics 42 (October 1998), 261-288. 
  
  Bernanke, Benjamin S., and Blinder Alan S., “The Federal Funds Rate And The Channels 
Of Monetary Transmission,” American Economic Review 82 (September 1992), 901-921. 






   Bernanke, Ben, and Gertler, Mark, “Financial Fragility And Economic Performance,” The 
Quarterly Journal Of Economics 105 (February 1990,  
87-114.  
 
  Bernanke, Ben, Gertler, Mark, Gilchrist, Simon, “The Financial Accelerator And The Flight 
To Quality,” The Review Of Economics And Statistics 78 (February 1996), 1-15. 
 
  Blanchard, Olivier J., “Why Does Money Affect Output?: A Survey,” in Benjamin 
Friedman and Frank H. Hahn (eds.), Handbook Of Monetary Economics, Volume 2 (Amsterdam: 
Elsevier North-Holland, 1990), 779-835. 
 
  Blinder, Alan S., "Comment: ‘Financing Constraints And Corporate Investment,’” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1988:1,  196-200. 
 
  Blundell, Richard, and Bond, Stephen, “Initial Conditions And Moment Restrictions In 
Dynamic Panel Data Models,” Journal Of Econometrics 87 (1998). 115-144. 
  
  Bond, Stephen, Elston, Julie, Mairesse, Jacques, Mulkay, Benot, “Financial Factors And 
Investment In Belgium, France, Germany, and the UK: A Comparison Using Company Panel 
Data,” Oxford And The Institute For Fiscal Studies (December 2001).  
  
  Caballero, Ricardo J., “Aggregate Investment,” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford 
(eds.), Handbook Of Macroeconomics, Volume 1B (Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland), 1999), 
813-862. 
  
  Chenells, Lucy, and Griffith, Rachel, Taxing Profits In A Changing World (London: The 
Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1997). 
 
  Chirinko, Robert S., "Business Tax Policy, The Lucas Critique, And Lessons from the 
1980s," American Economic Review 78 (May 1988), 206-210. 
 
    Chirinko, Robert S, "Business Fixed Investment:  A Critical Survey Of Modeling Strategies, 
Empirical Results, And Policy Implications," Journal of Economic Literature 31 (December 
1993a), 1875-1911. 
 
  Chirinko, Robert S., Econometric Models And Empirical Findings For Business Investment 
(New York: Basil Blackwell, 1993b).  (A Monograph in the Salomon Brothers Center Series 
Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments.) 
  
  Chirinko, Robert S., Fazzari, Steven M., and Meyer, Andrew P., "How Responsive Is 
Business Capital Formation To Its User Cost?: An Exploration With Micro Data," Journal of 
Public Economics 74 (October 1999), 53-80. 
  
  Christiano, Lawrence J., Eichenbaum, Martin, Evans, Charles L., “The Effects Of Monetary 
Policy Shocks: Evidence From The Flow Of Funds,” Review Of Economics And Statistics 78 
(1996), 16-34. 






  Christiano, Lawrence J., Eichenbaum, Martin, Evans, Charles L., “Monetary Policy Shocks: 
What Have We Learned And To What End?,” in John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford (eds.), 
Handbook Of Macroeconomics, Volume 1A (Amsterdam: Elsevier North-Holland), 1999), 65-148. 
 
  Coen, Robert M., "Tax Policy And Investment Behavior: Comment," American Economic 
Review 59 (June 1969), 370-379. 
  
Deutsche Bundesbank, “The Methodological Basis Of The Deutsche Bundesbank’s 
Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics,” Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report 50 (October 1998), 49-
64.   
 
Deutsche Bundesbank, “The Bundesbank’s Method Of Assessing The Creditworthiness Of 
Business Enterprises,” Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report 50 (January 1999), 51-63.   
 
  Dixit, Avinash K., and Pindyck, Robert S., Investment Under Uncertainty (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1994). 
 
   Eisner, Robert, and Nadiri, M. Ishaq, "Investment Behavior And Neo-Classical Theory," 
The Review of Economics and Statistics 50 (August 1968), 369-382. 
 
  Eisner, Robert, and Nadiri, M. Ishaq, "Neoclassical Theory Of Investment Behavior: A 
Comment," The Review of Economics and Statistics 52 (May 1970), 216-222. 
 
  Elsas, R., and Krahnen, Jan P., “Is Relationship-Lending Special? Evidence From Credit-
File Data In Germany,” Journal Of Banking And Finance 22 (1998), 1283-1316. 
 
  Erickson, Timothy, and Whited, Toni M., “Measurement Error And The Relationship 
Between Investment And q,” Journal Of Political Economy 108 (October 2000), 1027-1057.  
  
  Fazzari, Steven M., Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Petersen, Bruce C., "Financing Constraints And 
Corporate Investment,” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (1988:1), 141-195. 
 
  Fazzari, Steven M., Hubbard, R. Glenn, and Petersen, Bruce C., "Investment-Cash Flow 
Sensitivities Are Useful: A Comment On Kaplan and Zingales," Quarterly Journal of Economics 
115 (May 2000), 695-705. 
 
   Friedman, Milton, and Schwartz, Anna J., A Monetary History Of The United States 1867-
1960 (Princeton: Princeton University Press (for the NBER), 1963).   
  
  Greenspan, Alan, ”Greenspan Says Fed’s Rate Cuts Are Working,” New York Times (July 
25, 2001), Section C, page 6. 
 
   Hall, Robert E., and Jorgenson, Dale W., "Tax Policy And Investment Behavior," American 
Economic Review 57 (June 1967), 391-414. 
 
  Hall, Robert E., and Jorgenson, Dale W., "Tax Policy And Investment Behavior: Reply And 






   Hansen, Lars Peter, "Large Sample Properties Of Generalized Method Of Moments 
Estimators," Econometrica 50 (July 1982), 1029-1054. 
 
  Harhoff, Dietmar, and Ramb, Fred, “Investment And Taxation: Evidence From Firm-Level 
Panel Data,” in Deutsche Bundesbank (ed.), Investing Today For The World Of Tomorrow: Studies 
On The Investment Process In Europe (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2001), 47-73. 
   
Hassett, Kevin A., and Hubbard, R. Glenn, "Tax Policy And Investment," in Alan J. 
Auerbach, ed., Fiscal Policy:  Lessons from Economic Research (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1997), 
339-385. 
 
  Hubbard, R. Glenn, "Capital-Market Imperfections And Investment," Journal of Economic 
Literature 36 (March 1998), 193-225. 
  
    Jorgenson, Dale W., "Capital Theory And Investment Behavior," American Economic 
Review 53 (May 1963), 247-259. 
 
  Jorgenson, Dale W., "Rational Distributed Lag Functions," Econometrica 34 (January 
1966), 135-149. 
 
  Jorgenson, Dale W., and Stephenson, James A., "The Time Structure Of Investment 
Behavior In U.S. Manufacturing, 1947-1960," The Review of Economics and Statistics 49 (February 
1967), 16-27. 
 
  Jorgenson, Dale W., and Stephenson, James A.,  "Issues In The Development Of The 
Neoclassical Theory Of Investment Behavior," The Review of Economics and Statistics 51 (August 
1969), 346-353. 
  
  von Kalckreuth, Ulf, “Exploring The Role Of Uncertainty For Corporate Investment 
Decisions In Germany,” Economic Research Group Of The Deutsche Bundesbank Discussion 
Paper 5/00 (September 2000). 
 
  Kaplan, Steven N., and Zingales, Luigi, "Do Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Provide 
Useful Measures Of Finance Constraints?," Quarterly Journal Of Economics 112 (February 1997), 
169-215. 
 
  Kaplan, Steven N., and Zingales, Luigi, "Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivities Are Not Valid 
Measures Of Financing Constraints," Quarterly Journal Of Economics 115 (May 2000), 707-712. 
 
  King, Mervyn A., and Fullerton, Don (eds.), The Taxation of Income from Capital 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press (for the NBER), 1984). 
  
  Mishkin, Frederic S., “Symposium On The Monetary Transmission Mechanism,” Journal 
Of Economic Perspectives 9 (Fall 1995), 3-96. 
 
OECD, Taxing Profits In A Global Economy. Domestic and International Issues (Paris: 
OECD, 1991). 






Oliner, Stephen D.,  and Rudebusch, Glenn D., “Sources Of The Financing Hierarchy For 
Business Investment,” The Review Of Economics And Statistics 74 (November 1992), 643-654.  
 
 Ramb,  Fred,  Steuersystem und Investitionstaetigkeit.  Eine Panelokoekonometrische 
Untersuchung fuer Deutschland (Taxation And Investment: A Panel Econometric Investigation For 
Germany) (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2003).   
 
  Romer, Christina D., and Romer, David H., “Does Monetary Policy Matter? A New Test In 
The Spirit Of Friedman and Schwartz,” NBER Macroeconomic Annual 1989 (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1989), 121-170. 
 
  Rudebusch, Glenn D., “Assessing The Lucas Critique In Monetary Policy Models,” Federal 
Reserve Bank Of San Francisco (February 2002). 
 
   Sargan, John D., “The Estimation Of Economic Relationships Using Instrumental 
Variables,” Econometrica 26 (1958), 393-415.   
 
  Schiantarelli, Fabio, “Financial Constraints And Investment: A Critical Review Of 
Methodological Issues And International Evidence,” in Joe Peek and Eric S. Rosengren (eds.), Is 
Bank Lending Important For The Transmission Of Monetary Policy? (Boston: Federal Reserve 
Bank Of Boston, 1995), 177-214.   
 
Sinn, Hans-Werner, “Systeme Der Kapitaleinkommensbesteuerung: Ein 
Allokationstheorethischer Vergleich” (“Systems of Capital Income Taxation: A Comparison With 
Respect To Allocation”), in Dieter Boes, Manfred Rose, and Christian Seidl (eds.), Beitraege Zur 
Neueren Steuertheorie: Referate Des Finanztheoretischen Seminars Im Kloster Neustift Bei Brixen 
1983 (Berlin: Springer, 1984), 209-238. 
 
Sinn, Hans-Werner, Capital Income Taxation And Resource Allocation (Amsterdam: North-
Holland, 1987).  (Published in German as Kapitalein-kommensbesteuerung (Tuebingen: Mohr, 
1985).)  
 
   Stiglitz, Joseph E., and Weiss, Andrew, "Credit Rationing In Markets With Imperfect 
Information," American Economic Review 71 (June 1981),  
393-410. 
 
  Stoess, Elmar, “Deutsche Bundesbank's Corporate Balance Sheet Statistics And Areas of 
Application,” Schmollers Jahrbuch: Zeitschrift fuer Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften (Journal 
of Applied Social Science Studies) 121 (Spring 2001), 131-137.   
  
  Taylor, John B., "Monetary Policy And The Stability Of Macroeconomic Relationships," 
Journal of Applied Econometrics 4 (December 1989),  
S161-S178. 
   
  Taylor, John B., “The Monetary Transmission Framework: An Empirical Framework,” 
Journal Of Economic Perspectives 9 (Fall 1995), 11-26. 






  Williamson, Stephen D., “Costly Monitoring, Loan Contracts, And Equilibrium Credit 
Rationing,” Quarterly Journal Of Economics 102 (February 1987), 135-146.   
 
  Worms, Andreas, “Monetary Policy Effects On Bank Loans In Germany: A Panel-




The Construction Of User Costs Of Capital For Germany
25 
  The Jorgensonian user cost of capital (see Auerbach (1983) for a derivation) is 
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p
I p UC   ,       (A-1)   
where p is the output price level, p
I is the price of investment goods,  A is the 
present value of depreciation allowances,  is the nominal discount rate, 
I is the 
expected rate of investment goods price inflation, 
 is the economic depreciation 
rate, and  is the basic corporate tax rate (the rate of tax paid if no profits are 
distributed).  The user cost formula usually reflects investment tax credits determined 
as a percentage of the price of a purchased asset.  During our sample period, no such 
credits were granted to German firms.   
Our construction of user costs takes into account multiple assets, multiple 
sources of funds, and individual taxation following the approach developed by King 
and Fullerton (1984), extended by the OECD (1991) and Chenells and Griffith 
(1997), and applied to the German data by Harhoff and Ramb (2001) and Ramb 
(2003).   
If we distinguish as sources of finance between debt finance, new share 
issues, and retained earnings, the respective discount rates are given by 
 

  earnings   retained for         
    shares   new for 





















     (A-2) 
                                           
25 The user cost of capital for our sample have been constructed on the basis of the computer 
routines provided by Fred Ramb, who also allowed us to use his tax and depreciation data. Fred's 
help was crucial and decisive. As we made several changes, however, we have to bear 






In this expression, the variable  measures the degree of discrimination between 
retentions and distributions. It is the opportunity costs of retained earnings in terms 
of gross dividends forgone; equals the additional dividend shareholders would 
receive if one unit of post-corporate tax earnings were distributed. Furthermore, i is 
the nominal interest rate, m is the marginal personal tax rate on capital income, and z 
is the effective tax rate on accrued capital gains. 
  Between 1977 and 2000, the system of capital income taxation operating in 
Germany was a split rate system with full imputation.  Shareholders who were 
residents of the Federal Republic received a tax credit in the amount of the 
corporation tax on distributed profits paid.  Ultimately, the tax on capital income on 
distributed profits was equal to the marginal tax on capital income.  For Germany, 
therefore, the variable  assumes the value 1/(1-). Furthermore, the effective tax 
rate on accrued capital gains was zero, as capital gains were not taxed after a holding 
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      (A-3) 
In the system with full imputation that prevailed in Germany from 1977 to 2000, the 
two types of outside finance are equivalent (Sinn, 1984 and 1987).   
To implement this framework and quantify (A-1), we use sector-specific  
output price levels (pj,t) and depreciation rate (
e
j,t), where j indexes sectors.  
Depreciation rates are calculated from a perpetual inventory equation for sectoral 
capital stocks and investment flows; rates for 1995-1997 are imputed.  The price of 
capital goods (p
I
t) is an economy-wide deflator dated at the beginning of the year, 
and the expected inflation rate (
I
t) measures the rate of growth of p
I
t between the 
beginning and the end of year t. Aa,t is the present value of depreciation allowances 
as a firm-specific asset-weighted average for three different types of assets (indexed 
by a): building, machinery and equipment.  In each case, finance-specific discount 
rates are used.  (Aa,t is computed with an optimal switch from accelerated to straight-
line depreciation methods.)  The rate of interest rate (it) is the average yield to 
maturity of domestic listed debt securities. The tax rate on retained earnings is 
calculated as a compound tax combining three different taxes of profits: the basic 
corporate tax on retained earnings (
r
t), the local tax (Gewerbesteuer, gt, is 
deductible for corporate tax purposes), and the "solidarity surcharge" (st, which is 






      , 1 1 t g t g r
t t s t             (A-4) 
As in King and Fullerton, we treat local taxes as a normal tax on profits, ignoring 
some of its special features.
26 As a marginal tax rate for the shareholder, we used the 
highest marginal income tax 
max
t m , again inflated by the solidarity surcharge,   
    max 1 t m t s t m   .          ( A - 5 )  
To combine the different user costs resulting from the three different sources 
of finance, we use a flow weights defined for the three sources of finance as follows:  
debt (with total liabilities including the share of borrowed funds in the reserve 
subject to future taxation), new shares (the first difference of the stock of subscribed 
capital augmented by share premium or paid-in surplus), and  retained earnings 
(retained earnings with the earned surplus including the share of own funds in the 
reserves subject to future taxation).  For increases of debt, new shares, or retained 
earnings, the corresponding weight is calculated as a ratio to the sum of positive 
sources of new finance in that year.  If a particular weight assumes a negative value, 
it is set to zero for that year; in each year, the weights sum to unity.  For the first 




Derivation Of The Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) Model 
This appendix contains a derivation of the ADL model that is the basis for the 
estimates presented in this study.  The ADL takes as its starting point the demand for 
the desired capital stock, 
 
k*t  =   uc*t + s*t,           ( B - 1 )    
 
where k*t is the log of the desired (or long-run) stock of capital, s*t is the log of 
desired output measured by sales, uc*t is the log of the long-run user cost, and  
are long-run elasticities representing the technology, and the t subscript indexes 
time.  For expositional simplicity, we do not include firm-specific subscripts in this 
derivation.  Equation (B-1) follows from a CES production function containing 
capital and any number of additional factors of production.  Note that  is the 
                                           
26 Interest payments are only partly deductible, and the Gewerbesteuer payments are not credited to 
the shareholders on distribution. The latter, strictly speaking, destroys the basic equivalence 
between sources of outside finance. The Gewerbesteuer is raised at the local level. Due to data 
limitations, however, we have to confine ourselves to the mean Gewerbesteuer rate for the whole 






elasticity of substitution between labor and capital, and is a key parameter in 
determining the strength of the interest rate channel of monetary policy on capital 
formation.   
  The challenge facing the applied econometrician is to translate the above 
demand for a stock of capital into the demand for the flow of investment.  We begin 
this translation by assuming that investment equals the change in the desired capital 
stock,  
 
   	kt  =  	k*t,         ( B - 2 )  
 
where 	 is the first difference operator and kt is the log of the capital stock.  
Equation (B-2) is not a satisfactory investment equation because it assumes that the 
actual capital stock adjusts instantaneously to changes in the desired capital stock.  
Furthermore, k*t is unobservable.  To derive a useful econometric specification, we 
introduce dynamics with three assumptions.  First, we assume that the adjustment of 
the actual capital stock (or the investment-capital ratio less depreciation) to its 
desired level is distributed over time according to the following distributed lag,   
 
     	kt  =  It/Kt-1 -    =  a(L) 	k*t,       (B-3) 
 
where a(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator representing technological constraints 
such as delivery lags and other adjustment frictions. 
  Second, following Jorgenson (1966), we assume that a(L)can be 
approximated by a rational lag, b(L)/(1-c(L)), and rewrite (A-3) as follows,     
 
     It/Kt-1 -   =  b(L)/(1-c(L)) 	k*t,       (B-4) 

 =  +  b(L) 	k*t  +  c(L) It-1/Kt-2, 
 
where  =  (1-c(1)).  The b(L)’s, c(L)’s, and  contain technology parameters.   
  Third, at time t, one can consider the long-run values defining k*t in (B-1) as 
expected values based on current information.  We assume that these expectations 
are determined by the following univariate autoregressions specified as first 
differences, 
 
  	uc*t  =  duc(L) 	uct,         ( B - 5 a )  
 
  	s*t  =  ds(L) 	st,          ( B - 5 b )  
 
where the duc(L)’s and ds(L)’s are expectation parameters whose lag lengths need not 






distributed lag for user cost and sales variables in our investment equation may not 
be equal.  A disadvantage of (B-5) is that it uses a narrow information set, a point to 
which we return below. 
Combining (B-1)-(B-5) and appending an error term (et), we obtain the 
following investment equation, 
 
It/Kt-1  =   +   b(L) duc(L) 	uct  +   b(L) ds(L) 	st  +  c(L) t-1t-2  +  et, 
(B-6a) 
 
It/Kt-1  =   +  fuc(L) 	uct  +  fs(L) 	st  +  f(L) t-1t-2  +  et, (B-6b) 
 
where fuc(L) =  b(L) duc(L), fs(L) =  b(L) ds(L), and f(L) = c(L).  The f(L)’s 
represent estimated coefficients, and are a mixture of technology and expectation 
parameters.    
  The long-run impacts of changes in the user cost and sales are assessed with 
the following transformed set of coefficients, 
 
uc  =  fuc(1) f(1)),        (B-7a) 
 
s    =  fs(1) f(1)).        (B-7b) 
 
These long-run elasticities can have a structural interpretation in terms of the 
technology parameters --  and  -- if we impose the following restrictions, 
 
b(1) / (1-c(1))  =  1,              (B-8a) 
  
 d uc( 1 )     =     1 ,           ( B - 8 b )  
  
 d s( 1 )       =     1 .           ( B - 8 c )  
 
Equation (B-8a) implies that all orders for capital goods are ultimately delivered.  
Equations (B-8b) and (B-8c) imply that expected values ultimately move one-for-
one with changes in actual values in the information set.  Note that the validity of the 
’s as long-run elasticities is not dependent on the validity of these assumptions 
used to identify the structural parameters.  However, if we wish to separate 
technology and expectation parameters and thus, in principle, conduct policy 
experiments that adhere to the strictures of the Lucas Critique, such identification is 
essential.  The quantitative importance of the Lucas Critique and hence the need to 






  The information set used to form expectations of 	uc*t and 	s*t can be 
expanded to include additional variables (zt’s), and (B-5) is can be generalized as 
follows,   
 
  	uc*t  =  duc,uc(L) 	uct + duc,z(L) zt,      (B-5a’) 
 
  	s*t    =  ds,s(L) 	st + ds,z(L) zt.        ( B - 5 b ’ )  
 
If the z’s are variables already appearing as arguments in the investment equation 
(i.e., 	uct,	st, and It/Kt-1), then the estimating equation is not altered, 
 
 I t/Kt-1  =   +   b(L) duc,uc(L) +  b(L) ds,uc(L)}	uct      (B-6a’) 
 
                   +  { b(L) ds,s(L) +  b(L) duc,,s(L)} 	st  
 
                   +  {c(L) +  b(L) duc,I/K(L) +  b(L) ds,I/K(L)} It-1/Kt-2  +  et, 
 
 
It/Kt-1  =   +  (L) 	uct  +  
(L) 	st  +  (L) It-1/Kt-2  +  et, (B-6b’) 
 
where the (L)’s, 
(L)’s, and (L)’s are defined by the terms in braces in  
(A-6a’).  In this case with more a more general information set, identification of the 
 and  technology parameters becomes more difficult.    
  The estimating equation recognizes the possibility that cash flow may also 
enter as an argument to capture short-term credit constraints (i.e., entering (B-4)) 
and/or as an element of the information set used to form expectations of 	uct and	st 
(i.e., as another z entering (B-5)).  In either case, current and lagged values of cash 
flow (scaled by the lagged capital stock) enters as additional regressors.  Defining 
the cash flow coefficients as (L), we obtain the following equation that is the basis 
for all of the estimates presented in this paper,    
 
It/Kt-1  =   +  (L) 	uct  +  
(L) 	st  +  (L) CFt/Kt-1     (B-7)  
 
                   +  (L) It-1/Kt-2   +  et..   
 
The long-run impacts of user cost, sales, and cash flow are defined as follow, 
 
uc  =   (1) )),        (B-8a) 

s    =   
(1) ) ) ,         ( B - 8 b )  






cf   =   (1) 1)),        (B-8c)   
 
where uc and s are elasticities andcf is a semi-elasticity.  The only differences 
between equation (B-7) and equation (2) in the text is the inclusion of time-specific 
(t) effects and firm-specific subscripts on  and the variables.       CESifo Working Paper Series
(for full list see www.cesifo.de)
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